We aim to assess how accurately accounting and stock market indicators predict rating changes for Asian banks. We conduct a stepwise process to determine the optimal set of early indicators by tracing upgrades and downgrades from rating agencies, as well as other relevant factors. Our results indicate that both accounting and market indicators are useful leading indicators but are more effective in predicting upgrades than downgrades, especially for large banks. Moreover, early indicators are only significant in predicting rating changes for banks that are more focused on traditional banking activities such as deposit and loan activities. Finally, a higher reliance of banks on subordinated debt is associated with better accuracy of early indicators.
Introduction
Given the critical role of banks as intermediaries in the financial system, assessing a bank's financial health is essential for regulators. To identify risk in banking institutions, supervisors rely on early warning systems (EWS) to predict an improvement or deterioration in financial condition. Whereas most traditional EWS focus on accounting data, a strand of the literature recommends the use of market data (Berger, Davies, and Flannery 2000; Flannery 1998 ). Market indicators are expected to improve the assessment of bank financial conditions and provide useful signals for bank supervisors. Thus, market data could complement accounting information when evaluating bank financial health (Flannery 2001) .
Studies on banks in developed countries frequently tend to address bank failures or focus on reporting that market indicators add significantly to the predictive power of EWS models based solely on accounting data.
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In the emerging markets, most studies on bank failures focus on Asian banks, especially after the financial crisis of 1997. However, these studies primarily focus on contagion effects (Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000) or on the design of early warning models for banking crises (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 2000) . Previous work neglects the issue of predicting bank financial health at the individual level, which is crucial for supervisors and especially so under the new regulatory framework introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (Basel II accord).
Most of these papers consider supervisory risk ratings as proxies for default risk (Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck 2008; Evanoff and Wall 2001; and Krainer and Lopez 2004) and show that including market information in traditional models improves predictions of bank financial conditions. Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2006) report that for European banks, indicators derived from market prices are able to predict downgrades by private rating agencies over relatively long time horizons.
Under this new framework, which emphasizes disclosure and market forces, market discipline is expected to play an important role, and regulators can use market prices as signals to improve supervision. Assessing the accuracy of market and accounting indicators to predict changes in financial health is therefore an important issue for banking systems in general. This is even more crucial for developing economies with emerging banking sectors 3 that influence economic growth (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2005; Khan 2001; Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes 2005) .
In this paper we assess the accuracy of market and accounting indicators by constructing a prediction model for changes in ratings assigned by private agencies. 2 We extend the approaches used in the existing literature in several directions. While most studies look at predicting financial deterioration (rating downgrades or bank failures), we focus on predicting both downgrades and upgrades announced by three rating agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Fitch) that we use as proxies of a deterioration (bad event) or an improvement (good event) in financial health. 3 We begin our investigation by considering the standard binary and ordered logit models used in the previous literature, but we also develop a multinomial model, which allows for possible asymmetric effects. We therefore go further by questioning how well leading indicators predict both positive and negative changes. We demonstrate that an ordered logit model can, in some cases, be misleading because, in our sample, indicators that appear significant in an ordered framework lose their predictive power in a more general multinomial approach. Moreover, indicators that are significant predictors of positive changes are not necessarily significant predictors of negative changes. With a multinomial logit model, differences in the significance and value of coefficients for negative (downgrade) and positive (upgrade) outcomes capture asymmetric effects.
Our aim is also to select from among a very large variety of market and accounting indicators the optimal set of variables to predict rating changes. We further investigate the accuracy of different indicators for small and large banks. Because large banking institutions might be perceived as "too big to fail," analysts and market participants might react less promptly and less strongly to bad news than to good news. Eventually, the market might be less efficient in predicting the financial deterioration of particularly opaque institutions. We therefore test the ability of early indicators to predict rating changes for specific financial institutions. On the whole, our hypothesis is that the accuracy with which early indicators 4 predict changes in financial health could be different for downgrades and upgrades.
Moreover, some indicators might perform better than others depending on various factors, such as size and main activity (traditional intermediation, fee income, or market activities), and the extent to which debt holders can exert market discipline (importance of subordinated debt issues).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the method used to estimate our prediction model. Section 3 describes our sample and the different early warning indicators that we construct. Section 4 defines our hypotheses tests. Section 5 presents our results and reports a series of robustness checks. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Logit prediction model
Given that we attempt to assess the reliability of leading indicators by constructing a model to predict banks' rating changes using both accounting and market indicators, we need to develop an approach to select the most accurate variables (to predict upgrades and downgrades) from among a very large number of potential indicators. Our objective is also to consider a setting that allows for asymmetric effects (downgrades versus upgrades) and in which we can test the stability of the predictive power of the indicators with respect to bank characteristics.
The first step in designing an early warning model is to define events that could represent a change in the financial condition of a bank. As mentioned, most U.S. studies either use actual bank failures or downgrades in supervisory ratings to capture financial deteriorations, as in Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008) ; Kolari, Glennon, Shin, and Caputo (2002); and Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) . Due to insufficient data on explicit failures, studies on European banks use ratings from private agencies. Downgrades below a certain level (level C) are considered as proxies for bank failures (Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes 2006) , or more generally, downgrade announcements are simply used to capture a deterioration in financial health (Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi 2006) .
In our approach, we consider both financial improvements and financial deterioration.
We therefore use both upgrade and downgrade announcements by private agencies. These rating changes are from the three major rating agencies: Fitch, Moody's, and Standard and Poor's. From this perspective, our work links to the literature investigating the determinants of the ratings that private agencies assign to banks (Pasiouras, Gaganis, and Doumpos 2007; 5 Poon and Firth 2005; Poon, Firth, and Fung 1999) . However, we do not consider the levels of the ratings; rather, we use rating changes as proxies of bad events (downgrades) or good events (upgrades). 4 We then use accounting and market indicators to estimate the probability of a rating change. For most sample banks, accounting data are available on a yearly basis and thus at a much lower frequency than are market data. Accounting and market indicators are computed at the end of each calendar year. Because we aim to predict downgrades and upgrades rather than the ratings themselves, for most indicators we consider the changes in ratings rather than the rating levels. We then consider events (downgrades or upgrades) taking place during the following calendar year. Matching market data and accounting data in this fashion avoids the need to interpolate accounting data and ensures that the information content of accounting data is not inappropriately biased upward. Thus, the model's prediction horizon is at the most one year. However, the rating agencies' lack of timely ratings (Association for Financial
Formally, for each bank in the sample the dependent variable Y is equal to:
and conflicts of interest during the rating process (Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro 2009) are often underlined. This implies that a change in bank financial health may have intervened well before the announcement of the rating change. In that case, our indicators may be the determinants of the rating changes rather than the predictors of changes in bank financial health.
 1, if the bank is upgraded by at least one rating agency and never downgraded during the entire calendar year and if no upgrading took place during the last quarter of the preceding year (which could be considered as the same event announced by a different rating agency);
 -1, if the bank is downgraded and never upgraded during the entire calendar year and if no downgrading occurred during the last quarter of the preceding year;
 0, if the rating remains unaltered during the year; and  NA (not available), for all other cases.
Our investigation uses several types of models. First, to estimate the probability of a rating change, we employ the following multinomial logit model 6,7 4 In another strand of the literature, ratings are used as proxy variables for bank financial condition. For instance, Gaganis, Pasiouras, and Zopounidis (2006) , in a cross-country analysis, use Fitch ratings to assess the soundness of banks and to classify them into several groups.
:
for m =-1, 0, 1, 0
where C ji and M li are the j th accounting indicator and the l th market indicator, respectively. In this general specification, which allows us to capture asymmetric effects, the underlying assumption is that the same factors do not necessarily drive a bad event (downgrade) and a good event (upgrade). Alternatively, in order to check for robustness and consistency with the existing literature, we also estimate ordered logit models and binary logit models that only consider downgrades. To compare the different outcomes, we estimate binary logit models to predict upgrades. To select the set of optimal predictors of bank rating changes, we use a stepwise process. As a rule of thumb, we retain a 5% level for type 1 errors as forward and backward criteria. A Max (Min) LR statistic is used as a criterion for adding (removing) each potential indicator to (from) the selected set.
Data and variables

Sample
Our sample consists of major listed banks in Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 8 Our choice to focus on Asian banks is based on a number of considerations. First, as discussed, the relevant literature focuses on U.S. and European data. The increased flow of trade and foreign direct investment in both financial and nonfinancial sectors in the period following the 1997 Asian financial crisis also warrants a better understanding of the relevance On average, the sample banks constitute over 65% of the banking assets of listed banks in the respective sample countries. These sample banks are listed in their home countries and are rated by at least one of the three rating agencies: Fitch, Moody's, and Standard and Poor's. 7 We could also use a panel multinomial logit model. However, this would considerably reduce the number of observations. Indeed, only the observations for individuals who switched from one category to the other can be used to estimate fixed-effects panel logit models (see Baltagi 2005) . In our case, this would eliminate almost half of our sample.
7 of accounting and market information, as well as an investigation into the ability and perception of rating agencies, especially in the opaque banking industry. Additionally, in developed countries with advanced reporting and regulatory controls, accounting drives ratings, which reflect well-established ratios or other performance measures. But in countries where transparency is weak, rating analysts might rely on soft data sources and base their opinions on criteria obtained through indirect means (Fons 1999 In their work on the U.S. case, Curry, Fissel, and Hanweck (2008) study the impact of cyclical shifts in economic conditions on the prediction of changes in supervisory ratings. They divide the period under study (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) into three distinct economic periods (recession, recovery, expansion). In our work, which focuses on a shorter period, we do not explicitly consider such factors. Nevertheless, we attempt to capture such effects by introducing dummy variables in our regressions. These variables are not significant in our framework, which is restricted to a short-term, stable economic period. (Fitch 2005) , and analysts are reminded to be forward-looking and alert to possible discontinuities between past track records and future trends. Rating committees rather than individual analysts assign credit ratings at Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Ratings reflect both quantitative assessments of credit risk and expert judgment of a rating committee. Thus, no particular set of data inputs or formal rules can unequivocally explain a rating.
8 downgrades (upgrades) occur during the calendar year, we consider them as a single event.
Furthermore, for the sake of accuracy, we do not take into account downgrades (upgrades) that are preceded or followed by an upgrade (downgrade) during the same calendar year. In such cases, indicators expected to predict an upgrade (downgrade) might actually predict a downgrade (upgrade) (i.e., a movement in the opposite direction).
Insert Table 2 3.3. Independent variables Table 3 presents the set of accounting ratios commonly considered in the assessment of bank financial health. The ratios are grouped into the four categories of the CAEL rating, which stands for capital, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity.
Insert Table 3 Prediction models for bank failure make use of accounting indicators in level, as with Curry, Elmer, and Fissel (2007) and Gunther, Levonian, and Moore (2001) , or in variation (firstorder difference), as with Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi (2006) . Because the focus of this study is on the change (improvement or deterioration) in the financial condition of the bank, it is more appropriate to consider the changes in the ratios. Indeed, our approach considers banks regardless of their initial financial strength; only the annual change in the ratios captures the downgrade of a sound and safe bank as compared to a modestly performing bank. Table 4 shows the set of market indicators derived from weekly stock prices. The variables-such as the difference between the natural logarithm of market price and its moving average (LOGP), cumulative return (RCUM), cumulative market excess return (EXCRCUM), or cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)-capture the effects of shocks or the presence of abnormal returns. The change in the market model beta (ΔBETA) and the change in the distance to default (ΔDD) detect risk changes and changes in the probability of failure, respectively. On the whole, our objective is to consider the largest possible set of indicators that are consistent with the literature in order to study their actual contribution to predict downgrades and upgrades.
Insert Table 4 4
. Hypotheses tests
We aim to assess how accurately accounting and market indicators predict both upgrades and downgrades of Asian banks. As argued in section 1, the effectiveness of such indicators is likely to vary depending on several factors.
As a preliminary step, we conduct simple regressions to investigate the predictive power of each early indicator taken separately. We estimate a multinomial logit model where the benchmark case is Y=0 when ratings remain unchanged. Thus, we have a different set of coefficients for upgrades and for downgrades, with "no rating change" taken as the benchmark. For instance, a positive and significant coefficient assigned to a variable for upgrades indicates that a higher value of this variable increases the probability of an upgrade relative to an unchanged rating. Estimating a model more general than an ordered logit prevents the significance of coefficients from being driven by the occurrence (downgrade or upgrade) that might be more easily predicted.
We then consider the predictive power of accounting and market indicators via a stepwise process to investigate which indicators are better suited to explain downgrades versus upgrades. For consistency with the existing literature-which uses an ordered logit framework-we check if the findings are significantly different.
Hypothesis 1: The same early indicators might not predict both upgrades and downgrades accurately. Some indicators might perform better than others in predicting upgrades and/or downgrades.
As discussed, the effectiveness of early indicators might also depend on bank characteristics. For example, market participants could behave differently toward large and small banks. We can expect that market participants consider negative information regarding the financial health of banks deemed "too big to fail" less thoroughly than they consider positive information about such institutions, because they are convinced that such institutions cannot fail.
We can also assume that bank size affects the reliability of accounting indicators. For smaller banks, for instance, market indicators may be more informative than accounting indicators. Market participants might consider accounting information less reliable for smaller banks because accounting standards are generally less stringent for smaller banks (lower quality and lower disclosure frequency). Therefore, the market might monitor small banks more closely than large banks, which the bank's stock price reflects.
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We introduce a dummy variable (DBIG) that takes bank size into account to test whether the reliability of accounting and market indicators to predict rating changes is affected by bank size. This dummy variable is equal to 1 if the bank is considered "too big to fail" and is 0 otherwise. Two criteria combine to determine whether a bank is too big to fail:  If total bank assets are higher than $50 billion (a significant threshold in our sample asset-size distribution), the bank is considered too big to fail.
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The model specification to capture the effects of size and balance sheet structure is as follows:
for m=-1, 0, 1, 0
where DBIG i is a dummy variable that captures the effects of size.
11 A formal insurance deposit system was implemented in 1963 in Philippines, in 1985 in Taiwan, in 1996 in Korea, in 1997 in Thailand, in 1998 in Malaysia and Indonesia, and in 2006 in Hong Kong and Singapore. Coverage limits are often relatively low compared with U.S. or European standards, but banks (specifically large institutions) have also benefited from an implicit insurance system before and after the introduction of explicit systems for systemic risk and safety net considerations.
To assess the impact of size on the predictive power of indicators, we extend the method used by Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi (2006) Banks' main activities should also affect the accuracy of early indicators. In terms of modern banking theory, banks are considered inherently opaque institutions (Diamond 1984) .
Empirical evidence generally supports such a hypothesis (Morgan 2002; Crouzille, Lepetit, and Tarazi 2004; Iannotta 2006) . Opacity is likely to be higher for banks that are more heavily involved in traditional intermediation activities (transformation of deposits into loans) than in market or fee activities. However, we expect that a higher reliance on market funding and specifically a higher reliance on market debt that is not insured (such as subordinated debt) encourages market participants to monitor banks more closely, which promotes market discipline in the banking industry (Bliss 2001) . In this sense, because subordinated debt holders have strong incentives to anticipate accurately any change to a bank's financial health, market prices should have a strong predictive power.
To test for an opacity effect, we consider three dummy variables: a variable based on the ratio of net loans to total assets (DNLTA), a variable based on the ratio of deposits to total assets (DDEPTA), and a variable based on the ratio of subordinated debt to total assets (DSUBDTA). We consider both the structure of assets and the structure of liabilities to distinguish banks that are mainly engaged in traditional intermediation activities (transformation of deposits into loans) from banks that are more involved in market activities or in other nontraditional activities, such as providing services.
The dummy variable is equal to 1 for banks that are relatively more involved in traditional intermediation activities (i.e., if the ratio is higher than the median); it equals 0 otherwise. In our sample, the median value of the ratio of deposits to total assets is 80.9%, and the median value of the ratio of net loans to total assets is 54.72%. We also consider the importance of the ratio of subordinated debt to total assets because subordinated debt holders are expected to monitor banks more closely than insured depositors do. To test such a marketdiscipline effect, we define a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for banks that have relatively less subordinated debt (i.e., if the ratio is lower than the median, which is 1.5%); it equals 0 otherwise. The model specification and the tests are similar to those performed to capture the size effect. Table 5 shows the results for the simple univariate regressions in which each accounting and market indicator is separately introduced. Results are only reported when the coefficients are significant at least at the 10% significance level for upgrades or downgrades.
Empirical results and robustness checks
Results
We report both the results obtained with a multinomial logit setting and those obtained with an ordered logit model. These preliminary results suggest that predicting upgrades is easier than predicting downgrades.
Insert Table 5 In the multinomial logit model, five indicators appear as significant predictors of upgrades, whereas only three indicators are significant for downgrades. Moreover, the level of significance is higher for upgrade predictors. We find that changes in capital ratios and 13 liquidity ratios are significant in predicting upgrades; for downgrades, only the change in the ratio of net interest revenue to total earning assets has a significant coefficient.
For both upgrades and downgrades, two different market indicators are significant predictors. The difference between the natural logarithm of the stock price and its moving average (LOGP) and the cumulative return (RCUM) are significant to predict upgrades. The cumulative market excess return (EXCRCUM) and the change in the distance to default (ΔDD) are significant for downgrades. The signs of the coefficients are the expected ones, except for the change in the distance to default.
This surprising result can be explained by the relatively lower increase in liabilities for downgraded banks as compared to other banks, suggesting that when they are close to being downgraded, banks might experience difficulties in increasing the amount of deposits or in issuing debt on the market. 13 In any case, the change in the distance to default, as based on the Merton-Black-Scholes model, which combines both market and accounting data, appears to be a misleading indicator in our setting.
14 Several indicators are significant in the ordered logit model but not in the multinomial estimation: the changes in the ratios loan loss reserves to gross loans (ΔLLR_GL) and loan loss provision to net interest revenue (ΔLLP_NETIR) and the existence of persistent, negative cumulative returns (RCUMNEG). Moreover, when both models yield the same significant indicators, these are only significant in predicting upgrades in the multinomial framework.
Therefore, the multinomial approach appears better suited to capture different effects for downgrades and for upgrades that the ordered logit framework cannot distinguish in a straightforward manner.
Nevertheless, market indicators constructed solely with market prices perform as expected.
Insert Table 6 13 The amount of liabilities (the value of debt) is the strike price of the call option used to calculate the distance to default. A lower strike price implies a lower default probability. In our sample, the median of the annual change in total liabilities is $98.47 million for downgraded banks and $261.39 million for banks with a stable rating. Therefore, a possible explanation is that although the market value of bank equity starts decreasing before the actual downgrade, the relatively lower increase in the value of debt for downgraded banks is driving the distance to default in the opposite direction for these banks. 14 Other studies find that the distance to default is a significant indicator (Gropp et al. 2002 (Gropp et al. , 2006 . However, they do not consider the annual change in the distance to default. Thus, it does not directly compare to our results. Besides, Gropp et al. (2002) find that the distance to default is not a significant variable three months before a downgrade. They suggest that "many eventually downgraded banks exhibit a lowering in the equity volatility just before the downgrading, which causes the derived asset volatility measure to decrease as well, reducing the (-DD) value." This may also explain our result, as it implies a positive change in the distance to default for downgraded banks.
14 For the sake of accuracy, Table 6 also shows the results from the ordered logit model. Our findings confirm the conjecture that upgrades are easier to predict than downgrades, as shown by the tests at the bottom of Table 6 . All the indicators selected by the stepwise process in the multinomial model are significant predictors of upgrades. In contrast only one market indicator, the cumulative market excess return (EXCRCUM), has a significant coefficient for downgrades.
In contrast, the coefficient of the significant market indicator, cumulative market excess return (EXCRCUM), exhibits a higher significance level for downgrades than for upgrades. Market information seems useful to predict both downgrades and upgrades. In the ordered logit model, only two variables are significant: the change in the ratio net loans to total earning assets (ΔNL_TEA) and the difference between the natural logarithm of market price and its moving average (LOGP). However, these two variables do not significantly predict upgrades or downgrades in the multinomial logit model. Therefore, in the rest of our study we focus on the multinomial model and consider the ordered logit model for robustness considerations only.
In-sample classifications are reported at the bottom of Table 6 . The percentage of overall correct classification is above 50% for both estimation methods and higher with the 15 We consider this set of independent variables rather than construct an index on the basis of these indicators. Indeed, constructing an index with these variables would be restrictive, as we suspect that variables relevant to predict upgrades are not the same as those that are relevant to predict downgrades. Even if we construct two different indexes, it would not be possible to determine whether market or accounting indicators behave differently. Moreover, we also consider different subsamples for which the optimal index may be different. 16 Alternatively, to select the set of optimal predictors, we consider a general-to-specific criterion. We do not include all the potential indicators simultaneously because of the high correlation between several indicators. We consider a subset of indicators that corresponds to the indicators significant in the univariate regressions, except ΔNL_TEA, which is highly correlated with ΔNL_DEP. We then run a backward stepwise process. We obtain an optimal set of indicators very close to the one in this study. The only difference is the absence of ΔEQU_LIAB, which is not in the initial subset. 17 To account for possible differences among banks from the tiger economies and banks from emerging markets, we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for banks from the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand; it equals 0 otherwise. This variable does not appear as significant and therefore we do not retain it in the rest of our study. Out-of-sample classifications are at the bottom of Table 6 . We find similar results. The overall percentage of correct predictions is equal to 59.63% for the multinomial logit model and 65.17% for the ordered logit model. For downgrades we still find 0% in both specifications, and for upgrades the percentage of correct predictions is higher with the multinomial logit model (21.21%) than with the ordered logit model (6.06%). These results confirm that upgrades are easier to predict than downgrades and that the multinomial logit model predicts rating changes more accurately than the ordered logit model.
As mentioned, the possible existence of size and balance sheet structure effects might limit the accuracy of early indicators in the prediction process. Because of the existence of public safety nets for too-big-to-fail banks, the market might be less concerned about expectations of downgrades than about expectations of upgrades for such banks. In contrast, the market might look more closely at the financials of these large banks, which presumably issue more reliable accounting information as compared to the smaller banks. Hence, for smaller banks, market indicators could be more accurate than accounting indicators. Also, the effectiveness of early indicators might be different for banks engaged in different lines of businesses. A way to capture such differences and their implications for early warning models is to investigate banks' balance sheet structures to trace their main activities (traditional intermediation activity or market-oriented activities).
Insert Table 7 The results presented in Table 7 indicate that bank size affects the accuracy of early indicators differently for downgrades and for upgrades. For upgrades of small banks, the indicators previously selected by the stepwise process lose their predictive power: only the change in the capital ratio is still significant. In contrast, for large banks, only the market indicator remains significant, as shown by the results of the tests at the bottom of Table 7 .
Thus, market indicators are better predictors of upgrades for large banks.
We obtain the opposite results for downgrades. The cumulative market excess return (EXCRCUM), which is the market indicator previously selected by the stepwise process, is 18 Thus, we aim to predict rating changes occurring in the period 2006-2009. significant for small banks but not for large banks. Such a result is consistent with the "toobig-to-fail" hypothesis: market participants might not value bad news affecting large banks because of the public safety nets for such banks. However, another possible explanation is that the market might be less efficient at processing information for large and complex institutions than for small institutions that are more focused on traditional intermediation activities. Furthermore, because of a potential systemic risk, rating agencies might be more reluctant to downgrade large banks than small banks. Thus, the lack of timeliness of downgrades might be higher for large banks. This might explain why market indicators are significant predictors of downgrades for small banks but not for large banks. Rating agencies also might be more conservative toward small banks than large banks regarding good news; that is, agencies might adjust the ratings of small banks more slowly following good news.
This might explain why market indicators are not significant predictors of upgrades for small banks. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 7 show that the structure of bank assets significantly affects the predictive power of early indicators. No indicator is able to predict changes for banks with a relatively low ratio of net loans to total assets. In contrast, the indicators selected through the stepwise process (except for the change in the ratio of net loans to total deposits, ΔNL_DEP) recover their significance for banks with a high proportion of loans on their balance sheets (see tests at the bottom of the table). Indeed, the change in the ratio equity to total liabilities (ΔEQU_LIAB) is significant at the 1% level to predict upgrades, but the market indicator reflecting cumulative market excess returns (EXCRCUM) is significant in predicting downgrades.
for large and small banks. Predictions are better for large banks than small banks. Indeed, the overall correct classification is 75.55% for large banks and 63.02% for small banks. Interestingly, none of the downgrade predictions are correct for small banks, but 50% of the downgrade predictions for large banks are correct. The difference is even larger for upgrades, as only 9.37% of upgrade predictions are correct for small banks and 93.10% of upgrade predictions are correct for large banks.
Therefore, accounting and market indicators are only useful in predicting rating changes of banks heavily involved in traditional lending activities. In-sample classifications confirm that predictions are easier for banks heavily involved in lending activities, as the overall correct classification is 65.85% for these banks and only 60.97% for banks less involved in lending activities. More important, none of the downgrade predictions are correct for banks with a low ratio of net loans/total assets, whereas 50% of the downgrade predictions for banks with a high ratio are correct. The correct predictions of upgrades are also much more important for these banks (67.65% versus 29.63%).
The results obtained by using the ratio of deposits to total assets to construct the dummy variable (see the fifth column of Table 7 ) indicate that future rating changes are more difficult to predict for banks with a low ratio of deposits to total assets. Only one indicator, the change in the ratio of net loans to total deposits (ΔNL_DEP), is significant for upgrades.
Moreover, the tests at the bottom of Table 7 show that for banks that are heavily reliant on deposits, the market indicator is significant in predicting both upgrades and downgrades.
Therefore, predicting rating changes appears to be more accurate for banks turned toward taking deposits. The in-sample classifications at the bottom of As a whole, early indicators seem better suited to explain future financial changes for banks involved in traditional deposit-taking and loan activities. These results are the opposite of those obtained by Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi (2006) , who use only downgrades to define the dependent variable in a European context. Our findings therefore suggest that Asian banks that are more involved in traditional intermediation products and are not market traded might not be more opaque than other banking institutions, as indicated by Distinguin, Rous, and Tarazi (2006) . A possible explanation could be the lack of sufficiently deep financial markets and efficient secondary markets in Southeast Asia. The market might accordingly not convey sufficient information, even for institutions that issue a larger amount of market debt and invest in marketable assets. Nevertheless, market participants might make more effort to monitor traditional banking institutions because of their higher vulnerability to changes in macroeconomic conditions.
We also consider the role played by subordinated debt holders (Table 8 ).
Insert Table 8 No indicator is significant in predicting rating changes for banks that have a low ratio of subordinated debt to total assets, and only one accounting indicator is significant in predicting upgrades for banks that have a high subordinated debt ratio.
For further insight, we run the estimations on two different subsamples of banks depending on the relative weight of subordinated debt to total assets; we also run the stepwise process on these two subsamples. We first consider the initial set of significant variables for the whole sample of banks in Table 6 (see Table 9 ). No indicator is significant in predicting rating changes for banks with a low ratio of subordinated debt to total assets (below the median), but one accounting indicator is significant in predicting upgrades for banks with a high ratio (above the median).
We then rerun the stepwise process on the two subsamples (see Table 10 ). Our results clearly indicate that no indicator is useful in predicting rating changes for banks with a low subordinated debt ratio, but one market indicator and one accounting indicator are significant predictors of rating changes for banks with a high ratio. These results show that the proportion of subordinated debt in total liabilities affects the potency of market indicators. 20 Moreover, in-sample classifications at the bottom of Table 8 and Table 9 indicate that the overall correct classification is higher for banks with a high subordinated debt ratio (68.11% versus 62.06%).
Predicting rating changes appears to be easier for banks with relatively high proportions of subordinated debt, which is consistent with the presence of a market-discipline effect.
Insert Table 9 and Table 10 5.
Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks. We estimate logit models separately for upgrades and downgrades. The results also indicate that a number of accounting and market indicators are significant to explain future changes in financial health. In the estimations in Table 7 , we find that no indicator is significant in predicting downgrades for large banks.
However, this result could be due to the fact that the indicators selected by the stepwise process for the whole sample are not the best indicators for the subsample of large banks.
Therefore, we run the stepwise process on the subsample of large banks separately. The results confirm the absence of significant indicators to predict downgrades for these banks.
Furthermore, univariate logit estimations show that no indicator is individually significant in 19 predicting these events. For upgrades, when we perform the stepwise process separately on the subsample of small banks, one market indicator appears significant.
Additionally, we estimate the stepwise process on different subsamples of banks depending on the structure of their balance sheet, and we run univariate logit estimations for each indicator individually for different subsamples. On the whole, this does not affect our findings. Indicators are better suited to explain future financial changes for banks that are more involved in loan and deposit activities. Similarly, performing our estimations on a sample of commercial banks-which represent 88% of the banks in our study-does not alter our main conclusions.
Conclusion
The main objective of this study is to assess how accurately accounting and market Our findings suggest that Asian banks that are mainly engaged in traditional intermediation activities are easier to monitor than other types of banks. Nevertheless, our findings also show that the early indicators tend to be more effective for banks with more subordinated debt, consistent with the reform proposals aiming to impose a minimum ratio of subordinated debt in the banking industry (mandatory subordinated debt policy).
On the whole, our findings address the issue of how regulators might rely on early warning models to improve their supervisory actions. Specifically, if the market is unable to predict or simply reflect a decline in the financial health of some banking institutions, such models might not be reliable. Total downgrades 18 (8) 9 (7) 1 (1) 3 (2) 14 (6) 4 ( (2) 7 (3) 284 (75) 22
Total upgrades 25 (4) 59 (17) 58 (18) 45 (11) 97 (25) 104 (23) Upgrades by Standard and Poor's 7 (1) 18 (4) 20 (6) 19 (5) 40 (7) 86 (34) Upgrades by Fitch 1 (0) 16 (8) 12 (5) 14 (5) 43 (16) 94 (18) Upgrades by Moody's 17 (3) 25 (5) 26 (7) 12 (1) 14 (2) 
, , 1 ,
We obtain rm, the weekly market return, which we calculate from the country-specific market index, from Datastream International for the fourth quarter of the financial exercise preceding the event. (Net Loans/Customer and Short-Term Fundings) , ΔEQU_LIAB = annual change of (Equity/Liabilities), EXCRCUM = cumulative market excess return on the fourth quarter of the accounting period (financial year) preceding the event. 
